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counterparts. This paper uses an eciency wage model to explain the wage gap
between temporary and permanent workers. High-performing temporary work-
ers may gain promotion to permanent status, and a high wage to permanent
workers therefore serves a dual purpose: it aects the eort of both perma-
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ects of the labor market reforms in 1998 on inequality.
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1 Introduction
A large and growing literature discusses the causes of increasing Korean inequality. O-
shoring, greater exposure to the global market, and skill-biased technological change
have gured prominently in this discussion.1 These factors may have contributed
to increasing inequality, but legal and institutional changes can also inuence both
relative wages and relative employment. In this paper we focus on two changes: labor
market reforms have reduced the employment protection for permanent workers and
relaxed the constraints on the use of non-regular employment contracts. These reforms,
we argue, may help account for the observed patterns of employment and wages.
Non-regular contracts can take several forms, including xed-term contracts (the
employment relationship is terminated automatically after the xed term), part-time
work (dened as less than 36 hours of weekly work), indirect employment (dispatched
work and temporary agency work), independent contract work, on-call work/daily
work, and tele-work/home-based work. The dierent forms of non-reglar employment
share a common feature: all non-regular workers typically hope to gain `permanent'
employment, that is, to get a standard, open-ended employment contract. Fixed-term
workers make up the majority of the non-regular workers, and we shall use the term
`temporary' as a short-hand for the various non-regular contracts.
Temporary workers make up a sizeable part of the labor force in many countries
and a substantial literature addresses dierent aspects of this phenomenon. European
debates have focused mainly on the employment eects of temporary contracts (Cahuc
and Postel-Vinay 2002). Employment eects have been less of a concern in Korea;
ocial unemployment rates have been consistently low, averaging 3.4% over the period
from 1990 to 2012 with peaks of 7% during the East Asian crisis in 1998 and 3.7% in
the recent recession. In contrast to these modest uctuations in unemployment, wage
inequality shows a dramatic increase from the mid-1990s (see Figure 1). The increase
1Ahn et al. (2007) point to o-shoring to lower-income East Asian countries as a source of
downward pressure on the demand for low-skill workers; Hur et al. (2005) and Jeong and Choi (2004)
suggest that skill-biased technical change increased the wage for high-skill workers.
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in inequality coincided with pronounced movements in the share of temporary workers:
it rose by more than 10 percentage points from 2001 to 2004 followed by a decline of
about 3.5 precentage points between 2004 and 2012 (Table 1). The wage premium
for permanent workers was substantial throughout the period and increased slightly
after 2008. The movements in relative wages after 2008 dier across dierent datasets;
according to the Wage Structure Survey2, the relative wages has slightly increased;
the EAPS supplement, by contrast suggests a decrease (Table 1). However, the broad
picture is one of a stable wage premium.
Figure 1: Wage inequality and temporary employment in Korea
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Note: The ve distributional measures are the Gini coecient, the variance in log hourly wages,
and log wage dierentials between 90th and 10th (d9010), between 90th and 50th (d9050), and
between 50th and 10th (d5010) percentile. The distributional statistics are computed using the
Wage Structure Survey (WSS) 1985-2012. For calculating the share of temporary workers, the EAPS
supplement 2001-12 are used.
While clearly not conclusive, these simple patterns suggest that changes in the
prevalence of temporary contracts could help explain the rise in equality; this hypoth-
2The survey has information about wages, but they have dierent denitions of temporary workers.
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Table 1: The share of temporary workers and the relative wages
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
LT =(LT + LP )(%) 26.8 27.4 32.6 37.0 36.6 35.5 35.9 33.8 34.9 33.3 34.2 33.3
wT =wP (%) 72.6 75.5 69.0 71.9 69.6 71.5 72.3 69.4 63.6 65.6 68.2 68.7
Source: The EAPS supplement 2001-2012
esis gains support from the results in Kim (2014). Controlling for worker characteristics
as well as changes in sectoral composition, Kim's decomposition shows that, depend-
ing on the precise method of decomposition, the rising share of temporary workers can
account for 20-30 percent of the growth in inequality between 2001 and 2005.
The rise in temporary employment may be the result of labor market reforms,
but this explanation leaves several puzzles. A 50 percent rise in the employment
ratio LT=LP was accompanied by a relative wage wT=wP that was virtually the same
in 2001 and 2004. This pattern could be explained by assuming that temporary
and permanent workers are close substitutes but dier in terms of productivity, with
permanent workers being more productive. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that
temporary workers do not have a lower productivity (see below). More importantly,
the explanation is at odds with the ndings that temporary workers tend to receive a
lower pay after controlling for worker and job characteristics (Ahn 2004). And if the
two groups are close substitutes and equally productive, why do permanent workers
receive a large wage premium? Korean rms may face constraints that prevent them
from using temporary contracts, but no legal or institutional constraints compel rms
to oer their permanent workers a large wage premium. The presence of powerful
unions could have explained the wage premium but Korean unions are not powerful;
they have at times been militant, but the union density is very low.
In this paper we show how a wage gap between temporary and permanent workers
can be explained using an eciency wage model. Temporary workers have a chance to
become permanent, and this possibility { combined with the existence of an employ-
ment rent for permanent workers { gives temporary workers an incentive to work hard.
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Empirically, the transition rate from temporary to permanent is signicant: on av-
erage about 23 percent of temporary workers are promoted to permanent status after
one year (EAPS supplement 2003-07). Thus, a high wage to permanent workers serves
a dual purpose: it aects the eort of both permanent and temporary workers. Taking
into account legal and institutional constraints on the use of temporary workers and
on rms' ability to dismiss permanent workers, an eciency model along these lines
can be used to shed light on some of the eects of the Korean reforms.
Institutional constraints can take a variety of forms. In Korea some job categories
cannot be lled with temporary agency workers. Other constraints come in the form
of limits on the possibility to roll over temporary contracts. The ability of rms to
dismiss permanent workers is curtailed by restrictions, too; some of these restrictions
aect the average termination rate (but not the determination of who gets dismissed);
others restrict the ability of the rm to single out low performance workers.3 The
specic Korean reforms and their implications for the parameters of the model will
be discussed in section 3. But the key element in our argument is both simple and
intuitive, however: temporary workers may be motivated by the prospect of promotion
to permanent status. This argument is supported by a variety of studies.
Lautsch (2002) presents evidence for two Boston-based companies, Polaroid and
Sarco, for the period 1996-97. The study describes four management systems for
contingent work. Each of the four systems has distinct labor practices, including wage
rules and career ladders. The use of temporary workers in Polaroid Digital Products
exemplies our argument. At Polaroid, temporary and permanent workers worked
side-by-side in the same occupations. Despite their temporary status the temporary
workers performed at least as well as permanent workers in the same jobs. The prospect
of a permanent position motivated them to work hard: a survey showed that 75% of
3Restrictions of this kind are analogous to the restrictions that follow from an inability to monitor
the performance of individual workers. Thus, the eects of a relaxation of ring constraints can be
similar to those of `power-biased technical change' (Skott and Guy 2007, 2013). From this perspective
the Korean reforms involve `power-biased institutional change'.
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the temporary workers accepted a temporary position hoping to gain promotion to
permanent status if they performed well. This hope was justied: the best-performing
temporary workers (roughly the top 20%) were in fact rewarded by getting permanent
employment.
Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) show that Swiss employees with a xed-term con-
tract do signicantly more overtime work and are less absent than those with an
open-ended contract. They interpret this nding as signaling behavior from tempo-
rary workers who want to get a permanent position. Booth et al. (2002) and Givord
and Wilner (2009) reach similar conclusions using U.K. and French data. Givord and
Wilner nd that the transition rate from temporary employment to a permanent po-
sition is slightly higher when workers perform overtime work; Booth et al. conclude
that high eort among temporary workers is positively correlated with the probability
of career advancement.
At a more anecdotal level, there is signicant evidence that workers see low paid,
temporary positions as a possible route to a permanent job. An interview with a
Korean temporary worker { Miss Kim, 27 { in E-daily News, August 2, 2011, provides
an example. Miss Kim started to work in a public business as an intern in 2009.
According to the interview, she expected to transition to a permanent position if
she worked harder than existing permanent workers; because of this expectation, she
accepted a very low wage. The willingness of both students and non-students in many
countries to accept unpaid internships can be explained along similar lines (although
in principle internships are supposed to include a strong educational component for
the benet of the intern).
The model in section 2 presents a simple formalization of wage setting in a labor
market with temporary and permanent workers. Section 3 discusses the application of
the model to the Korean labor market reforms after the 1997 crisis. To be clear, the
model { like any stylized model { leaves out many features that may have inuenced
inequality. Thus, there is no claim that the model fully explains the rise in Korean
wage inequality. The aim is more modest: to highlight a particular mechanism that
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may have played a part. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Temporary and permanent workers are not always identical in terms of qualications,
and they sometimes perform dierent tasks. Any such dierences may clearly help
account for dierences in pay. In many cases, however, permanent and temporary
workers receive dierent wages even though they seem to perform the same tasks and
have equivalent skills. The model focuses on these cases: we assume that all workers
are identical with respect to qualications and that they are perfect substitutes in
production. Disregarding non-labor inputs, the output of the representative rm is
given by
Y = F (ePLP + eTLT ) (1)
where Li denotes the number of workers with i-type contract and ei is the workers'
eort. The model is set in discrete time. Workers are hired at the beginning of a period
and cannot be red until the end. We assume that workers cannot move directly from
unemployment to a permanent job; all permanent workers acheive their status by being
promoted from a temporary position.
Temporary workers Temporary workers work for one period; at the end of this
period they are either dismissed or promoted to the status of permanent worker. They
choose the level of eort to maximize the expected value of the stream of future utility:4
max
eT
VT = wT   v(eT ) + [p(eT )VP + (1  p(eT ))u] (2)
4Dismissed workers either become unemployed or get a temporary contract at another rm. In
equilibrium the value of these two states will be equal (see below). Thus, the expression in (2) covers
the possibility that dismissed temporary workers move to another temporary position.
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where wT is the wage rate for temporary workers, v(eT ) the disutility associated with
the eort eT ; and  the discount factor; u; VT and VP denote the expected present
value of future utility streams for an unemployed worker, a temporary worker and a
permanent worker, respectively; p(eT ) is the probability that a temporary worker gains
permanent status at the end of the contact period. The solution to the maximization
problem (2) satises the rst order condition
v0 = p0[VP   u] (3)
Consider the two functions p(eT ) and v(eT ): Given the permanent-worker wage pre-
mium, the incentives for temporary workers are stronger, the higher is the sensitivity
of promotion to eort. The ability of rms to link promotion to eort is constrained,
however, by the monitoring technology which determines the sensitivity of observed
performance to variations in actual performance (eort). It seems reasonable to sup-
pose that a rm's ability to distinguish between the eort of two workers will depend
on the ratio of their productivity. Using a simple specication with this property, we
assume the p(eT ) is log linear (with a ceiling at 1 and a oor at zero):
p(eT ) = minfmaxf0; p+  log eT
eT
g; 1g (4)
where eT the average eort of the rm's temporary workers. The value of  is taken to
be determined by the available monitoring technology; the value of p; which bears no
necessary relation to monitoring, determines the average rate of promotion. Turning
to the disutility of eort, v(eT ) is taken to be strictly increasing and convex. Using a
standard functional form, let
v(eT ) = e

T ;  > 1 (5)
Given the functional forms in (4) and (5), the rst order condition (3) implies that
eT = [


(VP   u)]
1
 (6)
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As indicated by equation (6), temporary workers' optimal eort is independent of the
temporary wage but increasing as a function of VP ; the value function for permanent
workers. These properties of equation (6) are quite intuitive (and do not depend on
the specic functional forms in (4)-(5)). Temporary workers cannot be red during
the period and are either dismissed at the end of the period or promoted to permanent
status. Their wage rate in the temporary job therefore has no incentive eects; it is
the prospect of promotion to a permanent position that provides the incentives for
temporary workers to put in eort. Because the temporary wage plays no role in the
eort decision, employers will want to set it as low as possible; that is, the participation
constraint must be binding:
VT = u (7)
The participation constraint determines the wage wT . By assumption unemployed
workers never move directly to a permanent job; the only way to get a permanent job
is through promotion from a temporary position.5 Using (2) and (4)-(7), we get an
expression for wT :
wT =(


  p)[Vp   u] + (1  )u
=(


  p)Vp + [1  (1  p+ 

)]u (8)
5This assumption implies that
u = wU + (u+ (1  )VT )
= wU + u
where wU is the ow utility from being unemployed and where the second equality follows from the
determination of wT by the participation constraint, VT = u: Thus,
u =
wU
1  
The value of wU is taken as exogenous; it may reect a range of factors, including income opportunities
in informal subsistence sectors and the level of unemployment benets.
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It follows from (8) that wT is increasing in  but decreasing in p: An increase in
 (in rms' monitoring ability) generates a rise in eort; with a given promotion
rate a compensating increase in wT is needed to satisfy the participation constraint.
Higher promotion rates, conversely, raise the present value of expected future utility
ows, allowing a reduction in the current wage without violation of the participation
constraint. Changes in VP ;  and u have ambiguous eects. An increase in VP reduces
the required value of wT for any given eort. But eort is not given: the increase in
VP provides an incentive for temporary workers to raise eort, with negative eects
on the utility ow wT   v(eT ); if this incentive is strong enough (the value of  is
suciently high), a rise in wT may be needed to satisfy the participation constraint.
Analogously, increases in u or decreases in  tighten the participation constraint, given
VP , and therefore raise wT for any given eort; induced reductions in eort may oset
this eect if  is high.
Permanent workers Turning to the determination of VP , the expected present
value of future utility streams for a worker in a permanent job is given by
VP = wP   v(eP ) + ((eP )VP + (1  (eP ))u) (9)
where wP ; v(eP ) and (eP ) denote the wage, the worker's disutility of eort, and the
probability that the worker continues in the job in the following period. The sensitivity
of a permanent worker's continuation probability to variations in her eort will reect a
combination of institutional constraints on the dismissal of low-performing workers and
technical constraints on the ability of rms to monitor the performance of individual
workers. These constraints reduce { but do not eliminate { the eect of eort on the
individual worker's risk of dismissal, that is, 0(eP ) > 0.
The value function can be written, alternatively, as
10
VP =E[
T 1X
0
(wP   v(eP ))t + Tu]
=u+ [wP   v   (1  )u]s (10)
where E is the expectations operator, T is the time of job loss and s = 1
1  can be
interpreted as the discounted expected duration of the permanent job.6 Permanent
workers choose the level of eort to maximize the value function. In a steady state
(with constant values of wp and u) the rst order condition implies that
v0s = [wP   v(eP )  (1  )u]s0 (11)
As in the specication of temporary workers' probability of promotion, we assume
that  and thereby s depends on the ratio of the worker's own eort to the average
eort eP : Using a log-linear formulation,
log s = s+  log
eP
eP
(12)
Equation (12) implies that
s0
s
= 
1
eP
(13)
6We have
VP = E[
T 1X
t=0
(wP   v(eP ))t + Tu]
= [wP   v(eP )]E
T 1X
t=0
t + uET ]
= [wP   v(eP )]E(1  
T
1   )  (1  )uE(
1  T
1   ) + u
= [wP   v(eP )  (1  )u] 1
1   [1 
1X
T=1
T (1  )T 1] + u
= [wP   v(eP )  (1  )u] 1
1   [1 
1  


1   ] + u
= [wP   v   (1  )u] 1
1   + u
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The specication of v(eP ), nally, follows from the assumption that all workers are
identical; the disutility of eort in permanent jobs takes the same form as (5):
v(ep) = e

P ;  > 1 (14)
Using (13) and (14), the rst order condition (11) can be written
eP = [wP   eP   (1  )u)] (15)
Hence,
eP = [

 + 
(wP   (1  )u)]
1
 (16)
As one would expect, a permanent worker's eort is increasing in permanent workers'
wages (wP ) but decreasing in the value of unemployment (u).
Equations (9), (14) and (16) can be used to derive the cost of job loss (VP   u):
VP   u = s
 + 
(wP   (1  )u) (17)
Firms Firms minimize unit labor cost subject to workers' choice of eort and the
participation constraints. Using (6), (8), (16) and (17) the minimization problem can
be written
min
wP ;wT ;LP ;LT ;p
wPLP + wTLT (18)
s:t: ePLP + eTLT = 1
eP = [

 + 
(wP   (1  )u)]
1

eT = [
s
 + 
(wP   (1  )u)]
1

wT = s
  p
 + 
[wP   (1  )u] + (1  )u
pLT = (1  )LP (19)
wP  (1  )u (20)
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Equation (19) is a steady-state condition: the number of permanent workers can
only be constant if the ow into permanent status (pLT ) equals the ow out of per-
manent employment ((1   )LP ). The inequality (20) is the participation constraint
for permanent workers: workers will only accept a permanent job if VP   u  0; using
(17) this condition can be written as in (20).
Equilibrium Consider an institutionally constrained equilibrium in which the ratio
of temporary to permanent employees, the average separation rate for permanent
employees (and therefore the average value of s), and the sensitivity of the ring rate
for an individual permanent worker to changes in the worker's eort have binding upper
limits. In addition to these institutional constraints, we assume that the sensitivity of
the promotion rate for temporary workers to variations in eort () is determined by
the given monitoring technology which is taken as exogenous.
As shown in Appendix A, these assumptions yield the following equilibrium solu-
tion:
wP = [
 + 
   1
1   + p
p( + ) + (1  )s(  p) + 1](1  )u (21)
wT = [s
  p
   1
1   + p
p( + ) + (1  )s(  p) + 1](1  )u (22)
where (1  ) is the institutionally determined separation rate for permanent workers
and p = (1   )=M; s = 1=(1   ): Equations (21)-(22) can be used to analyze
the eects of labor market reforms that alter the constraints on the use of temporary
workers (the ratio M) and/ or the constraints on the dismissal of permanent workers
(the elasticity  or the average dismissal rate 1  ).
3 Korean labor market reforms
Before 1997, it was dicult for a Korean rm to terminate employment contracts, even
if the rm suered a general decline in business. Because the economy had been grow-
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ing rapidly since the early 1980s, the strict protection of employees had not previously
been considered a serious problem. As economic growth slowed in the mid-1990s, how-
ever, reforms seemed necessary (Yoo and Kang 2012). Korean policy makers became
increasingly inuenced by the `Washington Consensus'. The dominant view suggested
that in an era of increasing globalization Korea's competitiveness suered from prob-
lems of high costs and low eciency; these problems, it was argued, could be addressed
by a deregulation of the Korean labor market which would reduce labor costs and allow
a quick adjustment to economic conditions. A relaxation of employment protection
was accelerated by the nancial crisis in December 1997; the crisis necessitated a bail-
out by the IMF, and the bailout was made conditional on the deregulation of dismissal
law (Cho and Lee 2007).
In 1998 two key elements of deregulation were implemented (KLI 2008; Cho and Lee
2007). The deregulation of dismissal law had been discussed at the Reform Committee
of Korean Industrial Relations in 1996 and spurred by IMF demands, the Tripartite
Commission reached agreement on 26 February 1998. This legislation introduced the
concept of dismissal of workers for \urgent managerial needs" (Yoo and Kang 2012)
and relaxed the strict employment protection on regular contracts.
Employment exibility was further enhanced in July 1998 by the decision to allow
temporary work agencies under the Dispatched Workers Act. Under the new law,
dispatching agencies are allowed to hire out workers to rms for up to two years in
26 occupations that require special expertise and experience (OECD 2000). The law
may seem restrictive relative to international standards by limiting the relaxation to
26 specied occupations. In a Korean context, however, it marked a signicant change
(ILO 2011).
These labor market reforms are reected in OECD indicators of employment pro-
tection. The indicator for strictness of regulation on temporary contracts - calculated
as a weighted sum of items relating to xed-term contracts and temporary work agency
contracts - falls from 3.125 to 2.125; the indicator for dismissal of employees on regu-
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lar contracts falls from 3.036 to 2.369 7. Additional labor market reforms were passed
in 2006 and 2007 (Yoo and Kang 2012). The eects of these reforms were relatively
minor, however, and left the OECD indicators unchanged.
Wage and employment eects of the 1998 reforms The reforms, rst, reduced
employment protection for permanent workers. This increased the sensitivity of a
worker's risk of dismissal to changes in her eort (i.e.  shifted up) and raised the
average dismissal rate ( and hence s = 1=(1   ) shifted down). The relaxation of
restrictions on the use of temporary agency workers, second, raised the upper limit of
the ratio of temporary to permanent employees (M increased ). The changes in M
and  have opposite eects on the average promotion rate p; we assume { in line with
the evidence { that p was left unchanged by the reform.8 Table 2 presents comparative
statics for changes in s and .
Table 2: Comparative statics
eP eT wT wP
s # +    if   p 7 0 +
 " +    if   p 7 0  if   p ? 0
The reforms unambiguously increase eP and reduce eT , and a rise in M increases
the share of temporary employment. But The eects on the two wage rates and the
relative wage cannot be signed in general. The ambiguity is resolved if  = p; in this
special case wT is unchanged while wP increases. A positive value of   p reinforces
the tendency for wage inequality to increase; a negative value may oset the rise in
inequality.
7http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm
8It is convenient to use s and p as shift parameters instead of the two institutionally determined
values, the permissible termination rate (1  ) and the maximum ratio of temporary to permanent
employment M . The values of s and p are determined directly by (1  ) and M : s = 1=(1  )
and p = (1  )=M:
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Numerical simulation can be used to evaluate the likely outcomes. Using plausible
parameters, we nd that the 1998 reforms raise inequality and the employment ratio
LT=(LT + LP ) signicantly; the relative wage wT=wP is reduced slightly. The details
are in Appendix B. The simulations are in line with the data in Figure 1 as well as
with the results in Kim (2014).
4 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by two observations. Temporary workers in Korea, rst, earn
signicantly less than comparable permanent workers. Labor market reforms, second,
have been associated with a substantial rise in the proportion of temporary workers
and a very modest increase in the wage gap. The theoretical model in this paper can
account for these observations and help explain the rise in inequality.
The model is highly stylized and has obvious limitations. From an applied per-
spective, perhaps the most obvious problem is the focus on a particular mechanism;
the model shows why identical workers can get very dierent wages in equilibrium.
This mechanism has, we believe, played a role but clearly the model does not tell the
full story. Not all workers are identical, for instance, and the assumption of iden-
tical workers excludes many forces that may have contributed to the rise in Korean
earnings inequality. The formal analysis, furthermore, introduces several restrictive
assumptions, including an exogenously given value of the value of unemployment (u)
and a steady-state assumption. An exogenous value of u would be plausible in a dual
economy with a large subsistence sector and a perfectly elastic supply of labor to the
modern sector. This description, however, no longer ts the Korean economy. Alter-
natively, the xed u could be justied as being part of the steady-state assumption:
the wage ratio is independent of u; and the analysis concerns the properties of steady
states with a given u: This immediately brings up another weakness; the Korean econ-
omy has experienced considerable turbulence in the last 20 years and a convincing
analysis of this period requires a relaxation of the steady-state assumption. This and
16
other extensions of the analysis are left for future research.
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Appendix A: Cost minimization
The representative rm's minimization problem can be written
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min
wP ;wT ;LP ;LT ;p
wPLP + wTLT (A1)
s:t: ePLP + eTLT = 1 (A2)
eP = [

 + 
(wP   (1  )u)]
1
 (A3)
eT = [
s
 + 
(wP   (1  )u)]
1
 (A4)
wT = s
  p
 + 
[wP   (1  )u] + (1  )u (A5)
pLT = (1  )LP (A6)
wP  (1  )u (A7)
Substituting (A2)-(A6) in (A1), the problem can be re-written
min
wP
pwP + (1  )fs p+ [wP   (1  )u] + (1  )ug
p[ 
+
(wP   (1  )u)]
1
 + (1  )[ s
+
(wP   (1  )u)]
1

(A8)
s:t: wP  (1  )u (A9)
This problem can be expressed more simply as
min
x
C[Ax1 
1
 +Bx 
1
 ] (A10)
s:t: x  0 (A11)
where
A =p+ (1  )s  p
 + 
(A12)
B =(1   + p)(1  )u (A13)
C =[p(

 + 
)1= + (1  )( s
 + 
)1=] 1 (A14)
x =wP   (1  )u (A15)
Assuming the inequality condition (A11) is met, the rst-order condition becomes
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   1

Ax 
1
   1

Bx 
1

 1 = 0 (A16)
Hence,
wP   (1  )u =x = 1
   1
B
A
(A17)
=
 + 
   1
1   + p
p( + ) + (1  )s(  p)(1  )u (A18)
and, using (A5),
wP = [
 + 
   1
1   + p
p( + ) + (1  )s(  p) + 1](1  )u (A19)
wT = [s
  p
   1
1   + p
p( + ) + (1  )s(  p) + 1](1  )u (A20)
The model loses its eciency-wage character if the participation constraint (A11)
is binding; in this (uninteresting) case, the solutions simplify to
wP = wT = (1  )u (A21)
Appendix B: Wage eects of Korean reforms
The calendar length of the unit period is taken to be 2 years in the baseline simu-
lation; this unit period ts evidence for the average duration of temporary workers'
attachment to the same rm. With this unit period, a standard value for the discount
factor is  = 0:9: Our choices of  = 0:774 and p = 0:4 are based on evidence from
the panel data in the EAPS supplement for 2003-07; the data show an annual con-
tinuation rate for permanent workers of about 0:88 and an annual promotion rate for
temporary workers of about 0:226. The values of  and  can be used to calculate
both the expected duration and the discounted expected duration of a permanent job:
the expected duration is given by 1=(1   ) = 4:43 periods or 8:86 years; the dis-
counted expected duration is s = 3:321. The implied steady-state value of the share
of temporary workers in total employment is 0:36.
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The remaining parameters in Table B1 (; ; ; u) are hard to pin down empirically.
The chosen value of  ( = 1:2) implies that an individual temporary worker who raises
eort (=productivity) by 10% increases her chances of promotion from 0:226 to 0:34;
an individual permanent worker who raises eort (=productivity) by 10% reduces her
per-period risk of separation from 0:226 to 0:1. These sensitivities seem plausible but
we have no real evidence and have not yet carried out a more detailed sensitivity
analysis to check the robustness of our results to variations in these assumptions. The
values of  and u were chosen to get a positive relation between wT and u (which
requires 1   (1   p + 

) > 0) and to achieve an empirically plausible value of the
relative wage.
In the baseline scenario the optimal eort levels for each type of contracts are
eP = 1:450 for permanent workers and eT = 1:764 for temporary workers. The precise
values of the eort levels have no signicance, but the result ts qualitative evidence
which suggests that eT tends to be greater than eP . Another way to look at the
dierences in eort comes from noting that for a temporary worker who provides the
optimal eort level for permanent employees (1:450), the probability of promotion
would be 19%, rather than 22%. The wage rates are calculated using (23) and (24).
The results { wT = 9:748 and wP = 17:375 { imply that temporary workers obtain
56:1% of permanent workers' wages.
The baseline simulation is in the rst column of Table B1; the results of the 1998
reforms are displayed in the second column. The 1998 scenario assumes a decrease in
annual continuation rate of permanent workers by 0.06 and an increase in  by 0.5.9
These changes produce a rise in wP and eP ; the rise in  makes permanent workers'
eort more sensitive to changes in the wage, thus giving rms an incentive to raise wP :
Temporary workers' eort goes down (because VP and the value of promotion drop)
but their wage is unchanged (because the two eects of VP on wT oset each other in
the baseline case with   p = 0). As a result, the distribution of income worsens {
9The new continuation rate gives an expected average job duration of 5.1; the observed average
duration of permanent jobs in Korea was about 6:2 years in the very early 2000s.
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Table B1: Numerical exercises
base 1998 reforms
 0:903 0:903
 0:774 0:672
 3:000 3:000
 2:000 2:500
 1:200 1:200
u 100:0 100:0
p 0:400 0:400
s 3:321 2:874
eP 1:450 1:591
eT 1:764 1:644
wT 9:748 9:748
wP 17:375 18:618
wT =wP 0:561 0:524
LT =(LT + LP ) 0:361 0:450
Variance of log wage 0:077 0:104
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temporary workers now earn 52:4% of the permanent wage (down from 56:1%) { and
the ratio of temporary employment increases to 45% (up from 36:1%).
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